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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective of the study – The primary goal of this research study was to 
investigate and document the evolution and historical development of the 
crime of aggression. 
Design / methodology / approach – The research study was primarily a 
desk-top based research by design and methodology. It reviews a range of 
published books, expert commentaries, and journal articles that provide 
theoretical and practical research on the evolution and development of crime 
of aggression through the past centuries to the present day. The discussion 
is majorly premised around key historical debates and events that shaped, 
and defined the rubric of the crime of aggression. These include: the 
philosophers‟ conceptualisation of the doctrine of „just war‟ or „unjust war‟, 
states‟ practice before and after the First World War and Second World War, 
the International Military Tribunals, the birth and role of the United Nations, 
the 1998 Rome Conference and the 2010 Kampala ICC Review Conference.   
Findings – This study provides information on each author‟s perspective on 
the status of the crime of aggression before and after the First ICC Review 
Conference. The study generally concedes that although today the crime of 
aggression is defined under the Rome Statute, and the jurisdiction of the 
ICC over it spelt out; its status under the treaty regime remains distinctly 
different from that under international customary law. 
Significance of the study – The significance of this research study lies in 
the fact that it is useful with regard to documenting the historical 
development of the crime of aggression. It also fulfils an identified need to 
clarify the position of the crime of aggression after the landmark First ICC 
Review Conference that took place in Kampala during May / June 2010.   
Study type – Postgraduate university Master of Laws research paper.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 
 
 
1.0   Introduction 
Aggression is closely linked to the use or threat to use force by one against 
another. Crimes and more so aggression have probably been in existence 
since man decided to live in organised societies. However, as man 
metamorphosed through different stages of societal development, his 
interests changed over time, and consequently the perception of aggression 
has changed dramatically and systematically. It may be very difficult 
therefore to identify with irrefutable exactness the definite point in time 
when man took issue with aggression, but there are marked out timelines 
and linked events that seem to have galvanized or reinforced man‟s opinion 
on aggression and its undeniable effects.  
 
The overall goal of this research study is to critically investigate and 
document the historical pathway of the crime of aggression to the present 
day. Critical to this investigation and analysis, is the contribution of the final 
outcome of the first International Criminal Court (hereinafter: „ICC‟) Review 
Conference that took place in Kampala (Uganda) during the months of May 
and June 2010.  
 
The findings in this research paper are discussed in five chapters: Chapter 
one is the introductory chapter of this research study, and covers the 
following preliminary sub-topics: the key-words most frequently used in this 
study, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study 
and research methodology used to undertake the study. 
Chapter two serves two purposes. In the first instance, it presents the 
findings of exposition into the literary meanings and philosophical 
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underpinnings of the term „aggression‟ within the context of state affairs or 
inter-state relations. In the second instance, it examined the international 
state of affairs that shaped the then international community‟s perception 
and conception of state precipitated aggression in 19th and 20th centuries 
just before the Second World War.  
 
Chapter three examined the „baby‟ steps that defined the development of 
the crime of aggression between London and Rome Conferences.  
 
Chapter four reviewed and analysed the outcome of the First ICC Review 
Conference with regard to the provisions concerning the crime of aggression. 
 
Chapter five on the other hand is the conclusion to this research study. 
 
1.1   Key-words 
 Aggression 
 Crime of aggression 
 First ICC Review Conference 
 International crime(s) 
 International Criminal Court 
 International Criminal Law 
 Rome (ICC) Statute 
 United Nations 
 Use of force  
 War 
 
1.2   Objectives of the Study and Research Questions 
The primary objective of this study is two-fold: On the one hand, this study 
seeks to investigate and document the evolution and eventual development 
of the crime of aggression to the present day. On the other hand, the 
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researcher attempts to critically examine the final outcome of the 2010 ICC 
(Kampala) Review Conference, in so far as it defined the crime of 
aggression, succinctly spelt out its elements as an international crime, and 
established the ICC‟s jurisdiction over it.   
 
The research questions that the researcher aims to answer are: How did the 
crime of aggression evolve and develop to its present state as an 
international crime? What crucial circumstances, events, institutions and 
people have contributed to the evolution and development of the crime of 
aggression? What was at stake, and what was decided at the First ICC 
Review Conference in Kampala-Uganda? What is the impact of the resolution 
that was reached at the First ICC Review Conference to the present legal 
order of international criminal law? What was the contribution of the 
outcome in clarifying, expanding or narrowing down the position of 
customary international law with regard to the crime of aggression? What 
criticisms can be made against the outcome? What potential challenges do 
the amendments pose for the ICC and the international community at large? 
What conclusions can be drawn from the findings of the research study? 
 
1.3   Significance of the Study 
It has been argued that it is desirable that any assessment of the legal 
limitations of the use of force (or state aggression) be made with a historical 
perspective.1 The historical perspective helps one to better understand the 
processes, and context in which the crime of aggression evolved. The 
processes and mechanisms of defining the crime of aggression have 
(re)gained international attention and prominence because of the gross 
violations of human rights and rules of international humanitarian law that 
                                                 
1 Brownlie Ian (1963: 1). 
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may take place in wars of aggression. And, also arguably due to the fact that 
at stake of being brought to account is not just the leadership of any 
aggressive state but impliedly the state itself.  
 
It is important to point out from the outset that not many authors have 
written wholesome monographs on the crime of aggression. Quite very 
often, what exists are books on the fields of public international law and 
international criminal law wherein the crime of aggression is tackled under a 
major topic like „international crimes‟; but still not given as much coverage 
as the other international core crimes2. What however also exist without a 
doubt are journal articles or commentaries written on various topical issues 
of the crime of aggression.  
 
As is often the case, it is however hardly possible for journal articles or 
commentaries to cover all aspects of a phenomenal subject matter like the 
crime of aggression in one article. Where the crime of aggression is covered 
in monographs, one hardly finds them to have been updated to cover the 
final outcome of the First ICC Review Conference. It is also the reality that 
many authors do not comprehensively investigate and document the 
evolution and development of the crime of aggression as an independent 
core international crime.  
 
Essentially, the significance of this study lies in its objectives, where the 
researcher hopes to try to close the intellectual gap existing in the present 
literature. The researcher hopes therefore to link the intellectual times 
before and after the First ICC Review Conference, in so far as the crime of 
aggression is concerned. Through the above avenue, the researcher hopes 
                                                 
2 For instance, in Antonnio Cassese‟s book, the author covered the following: War Crimes (chapter 4), 
Crimes against Humanity (chapter 5), Genocide (chapter 6), and crime of aggression with the 
discussion examining torture as a discrete crime (chapter 7).  
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to contribute to the existing body of knowledge, discourse and debates 
concerning the evolution, and historical development of the crime of 
aggression.  
 
Another important significance of this research study is that it is meant to 
inform the reader whether the First ICC Review Conference was a step 
forward or several steps backwards for international criminal law / justice, in 
so far as the crime of aggression is concerned.  
 
1.4   Research Methodology 
It has already been acknowledged that the history of the evolution and 
development of the crime of aggression is fairly well-documented though 
fragmented among different writings. There is literature on its philosophical 
bases surrounding its foundation and raison d‘être. There is also scattered 
literature examining the outcome from the First ICC Review Conference, and 
its possible impact on the ICC (hereinafter also referred to as the: „Court‟). 
 
This was exclusively a desk-top or literature-based investigation; where the 
researcher strictly examined the available primary and secondary literature 
on the relevant major topic and sub-topics. To this end, the researcher 
visited and made use of resources available in the libraries and on the 
internet. The findings of the study are presented systematically in a 
chronologically descriptive manner complemented with an analysis of some 
important events / institutions / documents that are significant to historical 
evolution of the crime of aggression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
TRACING THE HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF THE 
REGULATION OF THE ILLEGAL USE OF FORCE BY 
STATES PRIOR TO FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
„It is seemingly easier to evoke aggression than to dispel it, and easier to commit 
aggression than to define it‟3. 
 
2.0   Introduction 
Chapter two reviews and investigates the literary meanings and 
philosophical underpinnings of the term „aggression‟ within the context of a 
state of affairs or inter-state relations. The purpose of this chapter is 
therefore to trace the historical development of the concept from the ancient 
times to the period when the First World War occurred. The period was 
characterised by a debate concerning recourse to war by states and / or 
their rulers, and the doctrine of „just war‟. It is clear that during the above 
stated period, the term of aggression was hardly or rarely used in its present 
form, instead the terms „unjust wars‟ or „illegal wars‟ were used to describe 
one state‟s violent actions against another.   
   
2.1   Literal meanings of the term ‘aggression’ 
History has revealed that individual states tend to define the term 
„aggression‟ depending on their circumstances and interests.4 The difficulty 
in defining the term „aggression‟ has been well articulated in the following 
quotation:  
„Definition must involve generalization and employ elements which require further 
definition. It may also be said that no definition is „automatic‟, since the organ 
concerned must necessarily apply any criteria to particular facts. Particularly dubious 
                                                 
3 Ferencz Benjamin B. (1972: 491). 
4 Friedmann Wolfgang (1964: 142). 
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is the argument that a criminal may take advantage of a precise definition; one 
might assume instead that he would welcome the absence of a definition.‟5 
 
In essence, most attempts at definitions tend to be „general‟, „enumerative‟ 
or a „mixture‟ of both.6 A prudent way therefore to defining the crime of 
aggression starts with investigating the literal English meaning behind the 
term „aggression‟.  
 
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word „aggression‟, 
originated from the Latin words – ‗aggress‘ or ‗aggredi‘ that refer to the word 
„attack‟.7 Hence literarily speaking „aggression‟ means „an unprovoked attack 
or assault‟8. On the other hand, the Cambridge International Dictionary 
defines the word „aggression‟ as the “spoken or physical behaviour which is 
threatening or involving harm to someone or else”9.  
 
From the above two definitions, it is clear that the two key elements to 
understanding the concept of aggression, are that aggression usually 
involves an unprovoked behaviour or threats that are likely to lead to harm 
or injury being occasioned onto another person or a state (to put it in the 
context of this research). 
 
2.2 Philosophical underpinnings attached to the term 
‘aggression’ 
It is important to note that aggression as a legal concept did not develop in 
a vacuum, immune from societal and political changes10. To the contrary, 
acts of war or aggression have been an ever present constant among human 
beings, and in fact it has been argued by some commentators that the 
                                                 
5 Kemp Gerhard (2010: 165).  
6 Friedmann Wolfgang (1964: 142).  
7 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007: 42). 
8 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007: 42). 
9 Cambridge International Dictionary of English (1995: 26). 
10 Solera Oscar (2007:15). 
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notion of aggression is almost as old as human society11. The crime of 
aggression‟s cradle lies in the historical regulation of use armed force by 
states – the jus ad bellum.12 Björn Länsisyrjä further contends that 
aggression has its roots in the „the occurrence of war‟.13 To this end, 
lawyers, anthropologists, academics, diplomats and philosophers have 
debated this concept for the last few centuries but rarely reached near 
universal consensus (till the First ICC Review Conference in 2010).  
 
Therefore, a discussion of the concept of aggression cannot be complete or 
sustained academically without an investigation into the topical concept of 
war which is intrinsically linked to aggression in inter-state or different 
societal relationships. It is only when one eventually arrives to a complete 
understanding of the early writings on theories of „legal or illegal wars‟ and 
„just or unjust wars‟ that one effectively begins to understand the early 
writers‟ perception of aggressive wars.  
 
Ian Brownlie pointed out that although it was rare for advanced societies to 
leave war unregulated, they were in the same vein ready to go to war with 
others for reasons that were very often slight.14 Hence, it was the society‟s 
perception of how justified a war was, for it to be seen as legal or illegal. For 
instance, during China of the Ch‘unch‘iu Period (722-481 B.C) war was 
perceived as a legal institution that only existed between equal states, and 
not between a feudal state and its dependencies nor between the Chinese 
family of states and barbarians.15 In effect therefore, illegal wars or unjust 
wars could be equated to aggressive wars. 
 
                                                 
11 Solera Oscar (2007:9). 
12 Kemp Gerhard (2010: 4).  
13 Länsisyrjä Björn (2006: 9).  
14 Brownlie Ian (1963: 3). 
15 Brownlie Ian (1963: 3). 
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Ancient Europe was the birth place for the first debates concerning legal or 
illegal wars.16 Greek philosophy was underpinned on a practice of Greek 
states to assign a cause for starting or protesting a war.17 On the other 
hand, the Roman approach was concerned with the formal legality of war. 
Consequently, for both ancient Rome and ancient Greece, there was a clear 
distinction between „just war‟ and „unjust war‟, which was laid down in 
formal criteria to be recognised before war could take place. A number of 
philosophers can be quoted in this regard.  
 
The beginning point of this discussion is Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 -43 B.C), 
who is considered the grandfather of the theory or doctrine of „just war‟. He 
wrote that it may be gathered from the code of the fetiales that no war could 
be considered just, unless it was preceded by an official demand for 
satisfaction or warning, and a formal declaration had been made18. It thus 
can be concluded from his teachings that two indispensable conditions of a 
procedural nature had to be met before the commencement of hostilities, 
these being a warning and a declaration, failure of which one would be 
proceeding against the norm.19 Cicero further argues that, „…the only 
excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; 
and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have not been 
blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare”20. 
 
It is contended that the early Christian Church refused to condone war as 
moral in any circumstance, and to that end until A.D 170 its followers were 
                                                 
16 Stanmir A. Alexandrov (1996: 1). For instance, in ancient Rome a special group of priests called the 
fetiales, decided whether a foreign nation had violated its duties toward the Romans, and was formally 
mandated to declared war by one of the fetiales throwing a lance from the Roman frontier into the 
foreign land.  
17 Brownlie Ian (1963: 3). 
18 Dinstein Yoram (2005: 63).  
19 Brownlie Ian (1963: 4). 
20 Miller Walter (1913: 2). 
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not permitted to enlist.21 Another philosopher to propound the doctrine of 
"just war" was Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430A.D), who argued that 
“just wars” are defined as those which avenge injuries orchestrated against 
a state.22 He strongly argued that any pursuit of peace must, as a condition 
include the option of going to war as a mechanism of preserving it in the 
long-term, where such a war would not only be preemptive, but as well as 
defensive in order to restore peace23. To this end, wars for aggressive 
purposes as opposed to maintaining or restoring peace, were illegal. 
 
The works of Saint Angustine, went on to influence many other important 
philosophers, among whom was Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who 
taught on peace and war, and propounded the concept of justification for 
war under pre-determined conditions.24 He is quoted as follows:  
'In order for a war to be just three things are necessary. First the authority of the 
soverign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of the 
private individual to declare war, for he can seek for redress of his rights from the 
tribunal of his superior… Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who 
are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. 
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that 
they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.‟25 
 
Therefore, according to Aquinas, the resort to force or war by an entity could 
only be sustained if waged by a sovereign, propelled by a just cause, and 
complimented by the right intentions.  
The period leading up to the 17th century was marked by the development of 
a system of sovereign national states where large well organised political 
units (of the nature of a national monarchical government) with secular 
                                                 
21 Brownlie Ian (1963: 5). 
22 Shaw Malcolm (1986: 539). 
23 Mattox John Mark (2006: 196).  
24 Brownlie Ian (1963: 6). 
25 Brownlie Ian (1963: 6). 
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governments and commercial interest replaced ill-defined entities feudal-like 
with allegiance to the Pope.26 This slightly changed the way, war was 
perceived. For instance, Machiavelli (1492-1550) argued that, “war is just 
which is necessary” and every sovereign entity may decide on the occasion 
for war.27  
 
On the other hand, the largely theologically influenced views of Francisco 
Suarez (1548-1617) on just war did not differ too much from those of 
Acquinas.28 The former argued in his writings and discussion of war, that a 
sovereign ruler may resort to war, in default of obtaining justice from the 
Pope, to redress an injury inflicted and he may wage war for purposes of 
defence29. 
 
Another notable Philosopher on the just war theory, is Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645). According to him, war was just and permissible as long as it was 
accompanied by a public declaration or was executed in self defence or self 
assistance to achieve what a community needed.30  
 
Grotius is quoted in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, published in 1625, where he 
writes that: „…war is the situation of those who dispute by force of arms 
[and for any war to be] called just…that it is not enough that it be made 
between Sovereigns, but it must be undertaken by public Declaration, and 
so that one of the Parties declare it to the other…‟31. Grotius further 
observes that: 
„In the first principles of nature there is nothing which is opposed to war; rather, all 
points are in its favor. The end and aim of war being the preservation of life and 
                                                 
26 Brownlie Ian (1963: 11). 
27 Brownlie Ian (1963: 11). 
28 Shaw Malcolm (1986: 540). 
29 Brownlie Ian (1963: 4). 
30 Detter I. De Lupis (1987: 8). 
31 Green Leslie C. (2008: 1).  
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limb, and the keeping or acquiring of things useful to life, war is in perfect accord 
with those first principles of nature. If in order to achieve these ends it is necessary 
to use force, no inconsistency with the first principles of nature is involved, since 
nature has given to each animal strength sufficient for self-defense and self-
assistance‟32. 
 
The 17th century saw the emergence of a seemingly international legal order 
to replace to replace the previous existing system of Holy Roman Empire and 
Pre-Reformation Europe.33 It was during this period that a Law of Nations 
starts to take a strong root in continental Europe to regulate inter-state 
relations among a society of equal states.  
 
It is clear that throughout both the end of 18th and the beginning of the 19th 
century, the views of the civilised world were changing on what constituted a 
„just‟ and „unjust‟ wars or „legal‟ and „illegal‟ war. This being the „age of 
enlightenment‟, there is a clear shift of intellectual and diplomatic debate 
towards internationalism and common interests of humanity.34 
 
In 1758, Emmerich de Vattel writing in his Law of Nations, argues that the 
sovereign who takes up arms without a lawful cause is „chargeable with all 
the evils, all the horrors of the war: all the effusion of blood, the desolation 
of families, the rapine, the acts of violence, the ravages, the conflagrations, 
are his works and his crimes. He is guilty of a crime against the enemy […] 
he is guilty of a crime against the enemy […] he is guilty of a crime‟35. These 
views are important in view of understanding the later events in the French 
Revolution, and in the later 19th and 20th centuries.  
 
                                                 
32 May Larry (2008: 27).  
33 Brownlie Ian (1963: 16). 
34 Brownlie Ian (1963: 18). 
35 Reinisch August and Sahib Singh (2010: 6). 
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However, it was not until the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) 
that attempts were made to declare war or those resorting to it as illegal or 
criminal. In this regard, Napoleon having surrendered at Waterloo, and after 
being formally declared by the Congress of Vienna to be an international 
outlaw for having invaded France in violation of the Treaty of Paris of 1814, 
was deported to St. Helena by the British; who made the decision on political 
rather than legal grounds36. This in effect reflected the emerging view that 
to resort to war in breach of a treaty was to be regarded as illegal. 
 
Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), who is considered one of the most influential 
writers of the last century, thus argued that war is only lawful when it 
constituted a sanction against a violation of international law by the 
opponent37. In effect, if one is to wholly ascribe to the then prevailing view, 
Yoram Dinstein contends that war becomes a lawful response (a sanction) in 
every instance of noncompliance with international law (a delict), even if 
that non-compliance had not involved the use of force38. 
 
The philosophical underpinnings are important in two respects. In the first 
instance, they showed the then prevailing intellectual thinking with regard to 
when states could go to war with other states. Secondly, the „unjust‟ war 
doctrine laid the firm foundation upon which the 19th and 20th centuries‟ 
statesmen built their opinions of what would later amount to illegal and / or 
criminal wars of aggression. It has thus been argued that the just war 
philosophies had the beneficial effect of restricting the unlimited rights of 
war, especially after the rise of the nation states in Europe.39  
 
                                                 
36 Green Leslie C. (2008: 4). 
37 Dinstein Yoram (2005: 67).  
38 Dinstein Yoram (2005: 67). 
39 Detter I. De Lupis (1987: 127). 
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2.3   The Precursors to the International Military Tribunals  
The period ending the 18th century to the early years of the 19th century 
was characterised with implicit and explicit maneuvers that started to 
transpose the words „crimes against peace‟, „crimes against morality or 
mankind‟ or „war of aggression‟ for „illegal wars‟ or „unjust wars‟. The 19th 
century was particularly dominated by the unrestricted right of war and the 
recognition of conquests, qualified by the political system of the European 
Concert.40 However, towards the end of that century, states started to 
question the legality of a „right to war‟ and started advocating for a peaceful 
settlement of disputes among themselves.   
 
It is shown in this sub-section of the research paper, that the statesmen‟s 
reluctance to agree to a definition with regard to the concept of aggression 
may be explained by the fact that war even then continued to play an active 
role in states‟ political strategies and policy41.  
 
However, it is pertinent to point out that akin to all the precursors to the 
International Military Tribunals, is the fact that they were all clear historical 
attempts that were bent towards establishing individual criminal liability for 
the unlawful use of force or crimes against peace or crime of aggression. 
Whether successful or unsuccessful, they all represented attempts at 
illegitimising and / or criminalising aggression. 
 
2.3.1   Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 
The two Hague Conventions that dwelt on the subject of laws of war were 
negotiated at two separate Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 that took 
                                                 
40 Brownlie Ian (1963: 19). 
41 Solera Oscar (2007: 15). 
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place in The Hague, The Netherlands.42  At this point in time, the then 
existing international legal limitations were only concerned with the methods 
and means of waging war, so-called jus in bello, but not the right to wage 
war itself, jus ad bellum43. Gerhard Werle has thus observed that it was 
during the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, that the state‟s 
unlimited right to wage war first cautiously called into question44.  
 
Under article 1 of the Hague Convention of 190745, it was affirmed that the 
contracting powers recognised that hostilities between themselves must not 
commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a 
declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with a conditional 
declaration of war. The main value to be derived from a declaration of war 
was that it pinpointed the precise time when a state of war entered into 
force, and provided for a warning that, unless specific conditions were 
fulfilled by a designated deadline, war would commence ipso facto46.  
 
Interestingly, although the said convention was emphatic in its requirement 
of a declaration, it did not include a provision for the consequences of failure 
to fulfill this obligation; as would later be seen several conflicts thereafter47. 
 
2.3.2   The 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty 
The 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty was an international legal instrument that 
was concluded in the Paris Peace Conference with the aim of promoting 
„international co-operation‟ in order to „achieve international peace and 
                                                 
42 The Hague Convention of 1899 was signed  on  29th July 1899 and entered into force on 4th 
September 1900, while the Hague Convention of 1907 was signed  on 18th October 1907, and entered 
into force on 26th January 1910. 
43 Werle Gerhard (2009: 477). 
44 Werle Gerhard (2009: 477). 
45 Hague Convention (III) of 1907 Relative to the Commencement of Hostilities. 
46 Dinstein Yoram (2005: 30). 
47 Green Leslie C. (2008: 5). 
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security.48 It effectively as a result ended the First World War between 
Germany and the Allied Powers.  It is perhaps the most publicised and 
foremost attempt to apply the “concept of (individual criminal) responsibility 
for declaring or taking part in a war of aggression” upon the principle 
authors of the First World War49.  
 
The Paris Peace Conference, which started on 18 January 1919, established 
a „Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the 
Enforcement of Penalties‟ that submitted its report in March 1919. Wherein, 
it charged Germany and her allies with extensive violations of the laws of the 
war, and further recommended that all persons of whatever responsibility 
and rank were liable to criminal prosecution for violating the laws and 
customs of war or the laws of humanity50. In terms of important 
international criminal law legal developments, the proclamation in itself 
represents a significant step in criminalising aggressive actions of states. 
This shift in policy drew clarity to the question of responsibility for unjustified 
resort to war, an issue which concerned ministries and statesmen, and not 
just the pacifists and idealists51.  
 
Not all recommendations of the Commission were adopted by the Peace 
Conference, but under article 227 of the (Versailles)  Treaty of Peace that 
was drafted and adopted, it was provided that the Allied and Associated 
Powers would publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern for the supreme 
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties52. While 
under article 228, the German Government expressly recognised the right of 
the Allied Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of 
                                                 
48 Preamble of the Versailles Peace Treaty that came into force on 28th June 1919. 
49 Brownlie Ian (1963: 52). 
50 Beigbeder Yves (1999: 27). 
51 Brownlie Ian (1963: 52). 
52 Brownlie Ian (1963: 52). See also Green Leslie C. (2008: 5). 
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having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. However, 
the Kaiser was never charged because the Dutch Government refused to 
hand him over, and the German Government never took any serious step to 
try its nationals for the aggressive war that Germany had engineered.53 
 
The lack of cooperation of the Dutch and German governments coupled with 
the failure on part of the then existing international community to set up an 
international tribunal to try the Kaiser and others was largely due to lack of 
agreement on the legality on existence of international criminal responsibility 
for crime of aggression. In addition to the above, this period was 
characterised states insistence on the supremacy of state sovereignty. This 
probably partly explains why there was international mechanism put in place 
to try any one for the atrocities committed in the First World War. 
 
2.3.3   Covenant of the League of Nations 
The Covenant of the League of Nations was the legal instrument that was 
adopted at the Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War, and 
effectively brought into existence the League of Nations, the United Nations 
primary ancestor.54 
 
The Covenant of the League of Nations laid the firm foundation upon which, 
was built the process of regulating the use of force or aggressive wars in 
international law.  It also represented the first efforts towards shifting a 
political discussion of the same issues into legal perspective55. Further to the 
above, the Covenant fundamentally reversed the international law landscape 
by making any war between states a matter of international concern. The 
                                                 
53 Beigbeder Yves (1999: 27). 
54 Stanmir A. Alexandrov (1996: 30). 
55 Solera Oscar (2007: 21).  
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consequence was that war was no longer to have the aspect of a private 
duel but of a breach of the peace which affected the whole community56.  
 
In this retrospect, the preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations 
emphasised the treaty parties‟ duty „not to resort to war‟ in order to ensure 
international peace and security57. Article 10 prohibited the use of external 
aggression against the territorial integrity and political independence of the 
members of the League and creates the obligation to preserve them from 
such an aggression. While, article 11 provided that any war or threat of war 
was a matter of concern to the whole League.  
 
As a body, the League of Nations is also important since its Sixth League 
Assembly adopted a resolution on 25 September 1925 which stated that „war 
of aggression‟ constituted „an international crime‟, and the Eighth League 
Assembly also adopted a resolution prohibiting wars of aggression on 24 
September 192758. 
 
Although, there is no doubt that the adoption of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations represented an important stride towards the conceptualisation of 
the crime of aggression, one must not be oblivious to its outstanding 
shortcomings.  In this regard, the Covenant of the League of Nations did not 
define aggression, and did not have sanctions for aggressive states or 
individuals and still permitted war under certain conditions.  
 
2.3.4   The 1923 General Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
The General Treaty of Mutual Assistance was borne out of mechanisms 
aimed at plugging the loopholes in the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Although, article 16 of the said Covenant had created a security system, it 
                                                 
56 Brownlie Ian (1963: 57). 
57 Werle Gerhard (2009: 477). 
58 Brownlie Ian (1963: 71).  
 
 
 
 
19 
 
become apparent after the interpretative resolutions of the Second Assembly 
that member states did not consider themselves bound to take automatic 
action to implement the said article. Attempts were therefore made to 
provide more specific guarantees of aid to states threatened by the use of 
force59.  
 
In 1923, under the auspices of the League Assembly of the League of 
Nations, a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was drawn up that solemnly 
proclaimed „that aggressive war is an international crime‟, with the Parties 
undertaking that „no one of them will be guilty of its commission‟60. Article 1 
stated that:  
„The High Contracting Parties declare that aggressive war is an international crime 
and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission. A war 
shall not be considered as a war of aggression if waged by a State which is party to a 
dispute and has accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Council, the verdict 
of the Permanent Court of Justice or an arbitral award against a High Contracting 
Party which has not accepted it, provided, however, that the first State does not 
intend to violate the political independence or the territorial integrity of the High 
Contracting Party.‟ 
 
The drafting of the General Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, was important since 
it is one of the important steps that reinforced the process (started by the 
Covenant of the League of Nations) of regulation of aggressive war in 
international law61. Its shortcomings however where that its goals were 
never fulfilled, the penalty it provided for aggression were purely financial 
for the aggressor state, and it still signaled that states were not yet too 
comfortable with giving up their right to resort to war.   
 
 
                                                 
59 Brownlie Ian (1963: 68). 
60 Green Leslie C. (2008: 6). 
61 Solera Oscar (2007: 24).  
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2.3.5   The Locarno Treaties of 1925 
The Locarno Treaties take their name from Swiss city of Locarno, from 
where they were negotiated. They are important for their influence on the 
development of arbitration and conciliation in the practice of post-war states 
in Europe62.  
 
Under article 2 of the said treaties, it was provided that, Germany and 
Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertook that they would 
in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other 
except for: (a) legitimate self defence; (b) action pursuant to Covenant 
article 16; and (c) action pursuant a decision of the League‟s Council or the 
Assembly under article 15.7 of the covenant63. Article 4 noted further that 
breaches of article 2 of the treaty and articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of 
Versailles could be labeled either as simple aggression or as flagrant 
aggression64. 
 
The Locarno Treaties are very important in two respects. They expanded the 
grouping of acts that could ultimately fall under aggressive wars, and went a 
step forward to outlawing military adventures that had not sought to be 
resolved through international arbitration.  
 
2.3.6 The 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes 
The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was 
adopted by members of the League of Nations in 1924. It aimed at rectifying 
the deficiencies of the Covenant of the League of Nations through its article 
2 that provided for a comprehensive ban on war65. Like the General Treaty 
of Mutual Assistance, it also aimed at providing for mutual guarantees 
                                                 
62 Brownlie Ian (1963: 70). 
63 Solera Oscar (2007: 24).  
64 Solera Oscar (2007: 27). 
65 Werle Gerhard (2009: 478). 
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against aggression through creating but a system of obligatory resort to 
peaceful means of settlement that was combined with the security system66.  
 
Oscar Solera contends that although the said Protocol neither defined the 
term of aggression nor obtained the necessary ratifications to enter into 
force, it raised some important elements that were later incorporated in 
other international instruments67. For example, the preamble of the Protocol 
stated from the outset that „war of aggression‟ constituted a violation of the 
solidarity between members of the international community, and formed an 
international crime, where states would only resort to war in cases of self 
defence or when acting in accordance with the Council‟s decisions68. Lastly 
states more importantly undertook to abstain from any act which might 
constitute a threat of aggression against another State69.  
 
Article 10 defined an aggressor state as that which resorted to war in 
violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the Present 
Protocol. 
 
2.3.7   The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact 
The Kellogg–Briand-Pact that is a binding treaty to this date, was concluded 
between the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, 
Germany and several other independent states. It is also known by the 
names Pact of Paris, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and the 
World Peace Act. It crystallised the new spirit that informed the relations 
between France and the United States, and which invited all the Great 
                                                 
66 Brownlie Ian (1963: 69). 
67 Solera Oscar (2007: 26). 
68 Article 2 of the Protocol. 
69 Article 8 of the Protocol. 
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Powers to recognize the need to create a framework that called for the 
unconditional renunciation of war70.  
 
The Kellogg–Briand Pact comprises only three articles, of which the last one 
concerns procedural technical matters. The Preamble of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact states, that „any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote 
its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished 
by this Treaty‟.  Article 1 provides specifically that: „the High Contracting 
Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they 
condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations and with 
one another‟. On the other hand, article 2 further emphaises all disputes 
would be settled through pacific means.  
 
Yoram Dinstein holds the view that the Kellogg–Briand Pact helped in the 
development of „international law from jus ad bellum to jus contra bellum‘.71 
However, in terms of shortcomings of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Gerhard 
Werle contends that although the Pact was quite clear in its intent to outlaw 
the use of force, it was less clear on the question of criminal liability for 
aggression.72 It is also argued that although, the Pact provided for a 
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the Pact was not 
clear in that it did not stipulate whether it comprised all aggressive acts or 
only war in its formal sense73.  
 
                                                 
70 Solera Oscar (2007: 30). 
71 Dinstein Yoram (2005: 83). 
72 Werle Gerhard (2009: 104). 
73 Solera Oscar (2007: 32).  
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2.4   Conclusion 
The term „aggression‟ is a concept that can only be fully understood, while 
taking into account its historical evolution and development over time74. It 
has been shown that the state of customary law before the era of the 
Convenant of the League of Nations was entrenched in a presumption of the 
legality of war as an instrument of self-interest, and as a form of self-help.75 
The treaties and proclamations that came into existence thereafter 
reinforced how far customary international law had changed from the 
ancient times.  
 
From the above discussion, it is evident is that during the period under 
review, the terms „act of aggression‟ or „war of aggression‟ started to 
subsume the legal terms „illegal wars‟ or „unjust wars‟. It is also clear that 
under the same period, as time shifted towards the 19th century, states 
started to regulate when wars could be undertaken. Effectively, the concept 
of aggression in its several initial variants evolved from being a military into 
a legal concept.  
 
The experience of the First World War served as a catalyst in that several 
states started to discuss ways, rules and standards concerning the use of 
military force in international relations76. Although, it is clear that not much 
was achieved in defining and criminalising state aggression, it is also 
prudent to note that the aftermath of the First World War set the ground for 
debate concerning individual criminal responsibility for aggressive acts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Solera Oscar (2007: 15). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE JOURNEY FROM NUREMBERG TO ROME: THE 
GAINS MADE IN CRIMINALISING THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION 
  
„The ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a system of 
international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible to law. And let me make 
clear that while this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, 
and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn, aggression by any other 
nations, including those which sit here now in judgment.‟77 
 
 
3.0   Introduction 
This chapter examines key events and / or institutions that contributed 
towards defining the crime of aggression throughout the period from the 
Second World War to the adoption of the Rome Treaty at the 1998 UN 
organised Diplomatic Conference in Rome. It builds on the gains made in 
chapter one. 
 
3.1 The 1945 London Agreement and the International 
Military Tribunals 
The period after the First World War, reveals a period when statesmen 
started to take decisive steps towards defining what would amount to 
aggressive actions by states and / or the leaders of aggressor states. 
Historically, it marked the end of the balance of power system, re-raised the 
ultimate question of „unjust war‟, and resulted in a new drive to rebuild 
international affairs around a single oversight body (the League of Nations 
and later the United Nations).78 
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78 Shaw Malcolm (1986: 542). 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
It was perhaps the outbreak of the Second World War, and its devastating 
effects that played the most decisive step in the re-conceptualisation of 
crime of aggression during the above stated period.  The Second World War 
was fought between the Allied States (included: the USA, the Soviet Union, 
the UK, France etcetera) and the Axis States (included: Germany, Japan, 
Italy etcetera) running from 1939 to 1945.79  It had fatalities of between 50 
million to over 70 million.80  
 
The war started when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, while Japan invaded 
China in 1937, and later spread to other European and Asian countries and 
territories. During the war, some states were greatly appalled at the level of 
gross violations of human rights, and started taking steps addressing the 
situation. An example of such maneuvers was when in 1943 some of the 
Allied states formed the United Nations War Crimes Commission (hereinafter 
„UNWCC‟). Its mandate was to investigate Nazi crimes, with a view to 
preparing indictments for commission of crimes against humanity and 
genocide.81  
 
The body‟s mandate was later expanded to include the possibility of 
incorporating the waging of aggressive war within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of their work on war crimes.82 However, the said Commission 
later abandoned the scheme of incorporating the crime, since no agreement 
could be reached citing inability to reach a consensus and time constraints.83  
It was the UNWCC, which later called for the institution of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and other courts, and helped establish the 
                                                 
79 Sommerville Donald (2008: 5). 
80 Sommerville Donald (2008: 5). 
81(http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205901.pdf). Last accessed: 20/09/2011). 
82 Schabas A. William (2007: 17).  
83 Schabas A. William (2007: 17). 
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official lists of war criminals that registered 36,000 suspected war 
criminals.84 
 
When the UNWCC wound up, the ambitions of the main Allied Powers (USA, 
UK and USSR) were to set up a court for war crimes trials as proclaimed in 
Moscow Declaration of 1943.85 It was also clear that the Allied Powers had 
every intention to bring to book all the Germans that where responsible for 
her aggressive policy. This is very clear in the said Declaration, where under 
the heading „statement on atrocities‟, the three states noted thus:  
„At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in 
Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have 
been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, 
massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their 
abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished 
according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free governments which will 
be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries 
having regard especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece including Crete and other islands, to 
Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy.‟86 
 
 
3.1.1 The Nuremberg Tribunal 
After the main Allied Powers meeting in Moscow, they again met in a follow-
up meeting in London.  
The Moscow Declaration thus laid the basis for creation of the International 
Military Tribunal under the London Agreement of August 8th 1945. Article 1 
of the said Agreement called for the establishment „an International Military 
Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular 
geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their 
                                                 
84(http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205901.pdf). Last accessed: 20/09/2011. 
85 Blumenthal David A. and McCormack Timothy L.H. (2008: 15).  
86 Joint Four-Nation Declaration. 
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capacity as members of the organizations or groups or in both capacities‟. 
While, article 2 added that: „the constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the 
International Military Tribunal shall be those set in the Charter annexed to 
this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement‟. 
The London Agreement therefore embodies the first clear undertaking of the 
international community to introduce individual criminal responsibility for a 
state‟s undertaking of aggressive wars.  
 
The London Agreement had annexed to it, the International Military Tribunal 
(hereinafter: „Nuremberg Tribunal‟) Charter that stipulated the laws and 
procedures for the criminal trials, the jurisdiction of the said tribunal and the 
categories of crimes that individuals could be prosecuted for. Under said 
Charter, articles 1 established the International Military Tribunal for the just 
and prompt trial, and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis.  
 
Article 2 stated that it would be constituted of a principle and alternate judge 
from each of the four signatory states, while article 6 stated that the 
Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to try and punish individual persons who 
acted in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals 
or as members of organisations, committed any of crimes against peace, 
war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
 
Specifically, article 6 (a), the Charter spelt out crimes against peace as 
including: „planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing‟. This provision is of paramount historical significance since 
it constituted the first indication of what amounted to committing a crime of 
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aggression, although referred to in the Charter as crimes against peace. 
Robert H Jackson, at the time Chief Counsel of the USA and later Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg, explained the legal basis for the inclusion of the 
crime of aggression within the jurisdiction of the IMT as follows:  
„International law … is an outgrowth of treaties or agreements between nations and 
of accepted customs namely the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), the Geneva Protocol 
(1924), the Assembly of the League of Nations Resolution (1925 and 1927), and the 
Resolution of the American States (1928).. But every custom has its origin in some 
single act … Unless we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for 
International Law, we cannot deny that our own day has its right to institute customs 
and to conclude agreements‟.87 
  
The Nuremberg Trials were held from November 1945 to August 1946, 
where twenty two German high-ranking Nazis, of whom included Hermann 
Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Rudolf Hess and others, where put to 
trial.88 The judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal was revolutionary in so far 
as the crime of aggression is concerned, for it not only dwelt but introduced 
new international criminal law concepts.  
 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, before the Nuremberg Tribunal 
customary international law had not developed sufficiently to a point where 
it had outlawed going to war or aggressive wars, and more importantly, held 
anyone criminally responsible for the same. Through passing judgement for 
the indicted German Nazi leaders, the Nuremberg Tribunal is credited with 
introducing the principle of individual criminal responsibility under 
international criminal law for international crimes.  
 
On the contrary however, the Nuremburg Tribunal is criticised for applying 
ex post facto law, in so far as it tried Germans for the crimes against peace, 
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which had not been criminalised by the time, the said illegal acts took place, 
which represented a breach of natural justice.89 In answer, the Tribunal 
argued that perpetrators were individually responsible for violating the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, which bound Germany, and which in their interpretation 
criminalised a war of aggression.90 In the opinion of the Tribunal therefore, 
individuals who waged wars of aggression effectively had not only just 
breached the international laws of the day but also accrued individual 
criminal liability. This unheralded decision was unprecedented under the 
then existing international law arena. 
 
To buttress its argument that individuals could be punished for violations of 
international law, the Tribunal noted that „crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.‟91 The above statement juxtaposed individual criminal 
responsibility for state responsibility for aggressive wars. It has been said 
that the above new line of thinking had found its way into the Nuremberg 
Charter during the early discussions concerning article 6, albeit limited to 
'acting in the interests of the European Axis countries'.92  
 
The Tribunal also expressed itself on whether wars of aggression were illegal 
and criminal. The Tribunal noted that the solemn renunciation of war as an 
instrument of national policy necessarily involved the proposition that such a 
war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a 
war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are in so doing 
committing a crime.93  
                                                 
89 Werle Gerhard (2009: 482). 
90 Nuremberg Judgement (1946: 445, 446). 
91 Nuremberg Judgement (1946: 447). 
92 Heinrich Hans (2004: 43).  
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An analysis of the above shows that that the Tribunal in its wisdom regarded 
the terms of article 6(a) as sufficient enough for a conviction for the crimes 
against peace, and in effect saw no need to delve into investigating the 
position of international law before the London Agreement of 1945. The 
Tribunal thus concluded that a „war for the solution of international 
controversies undertaken as an instrument of national policy certainly 
includes a war of aggression, and as such a war is therefore outlawed by the 
(Kellogg-Briand) Pact‟.94 In effect, the Nuremberg Tribunal used and 
perceived the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as the legislation that illegalized and 
criminalised acts that amounted to wars of aggression.    
 
It has been argued however that the Briand-Kellogg-Pact of 1928, on which 
the Tribunal relied, did not go as far as declaring war of aggression to be a 
crime but rather confined itself to specifying sanctions for breaches of the 
ban on war, state.95  This for instance included the loss of advantages 
flowing from the Pact for the responsible state. On the contrary, the Tribunal 
drew a link between the enormity of the crime of aggression and individual 
criminal responsibility for perpetrators of the said crime. The Tribunal 
justifies the linkage by observing:  
„The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged aggressive 
wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing. Its 
consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole 
world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it 
is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole...‟96 
 
3.1.2 The Tokyo Tribunal 
On 26 July 1945, China, the UK and the USA, subsequently joined by the 
USSR issued the Potsdam Declaration, which announced the intention of the 
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Allies to prosecute high level Japanese officials for the same crimes 
committed by the Germans in the European war.97 Unlike the Nuremberg 
Charter that was a result of negotiations among the four main Allied powers, 
Tokyo Charter came out of an executive decree issued by General 
MacArthur, the Supreme commander of the Allied Powers in the Far East.98  
 
Under the provisions of the Tokyo Charter, article 1 established the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter: „Tokyo 
Tribunal‟), with the objective of trying and punishing the major war criminals 
in the Far East. Article 5 empowered the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to try 
and punish individuals or as members of organisations of offenses which 
included crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
More specifically, article 5(a) of the Charter provided for individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes against peace:  
„[The] planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing.‟ 
 
Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal that lasted a little over ten months, the 
Tokyo Tribunal took two and a half years, from May 1946 into November 
1948, wherein the Allied powers brought to trial twenty-eight Japanese 
military and political leaders.99  
 
The Tokyo Tribunal is to be criticised for its near duplication of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal in applying ex post facto law, and was essentially 
victors‟ justice since no citizens of the Allied Powers were ever tried. 
However, relying on the precedent set by the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo 
                                                 
97 Nuremberg Judgement (1946: 186).  
98 Ehrenfreund Norbert (2007: 113).  
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Tribunal held that the Tokyo Charter was not ex post facto law but an 
expression of international law then in existence and generally accepted.100 
It also ruled it was not unjust to punish an aggressor but rather that it would 
be unjust not to do so since „aggressive war was a crime at international law 
long prior to the date of the Declaration of Potsdam‟, and there was „no 
ground for the limited interpretation of the (Tokyo Tribunal) Charter‟ which 
the defence sought to give it.101  
 
The Tokyo Tribunal however conceded that it could not define the term 
“aggressive war,” but noted that Japan‟s unprovoked attacks could not be 
characterised as anything but aggression.102 It however linked the 
aggressive foreign policy of Japan to a single conspiracy of the defendants 
before the war to use the Japanese military and political apparatus to 
dominate the Far East.103 
 
The Tokyo Tribunal did not have a firm legal basis for the way it articulated 
the doctrine of conspiracy-liability with regard to Japanese officials waging 
aggressive wars.  In this regard, the Tokyo Tribunal totally ignored the 
threshold with regard to the required mens rea for the perceived charge of 
conspiracy to commit aggression. It has been argued that the defendants at 
the Tokyo Tribunal were not necessarily in the same position as their Nazi 
counterparts at Nuremberg with regard to their perceived responsibility for 
formulating and executing aggressive Japanese foreign policy prior to the 
war.104 
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However, despite its shortcomings, the Tokyo Tribunal helped to confirm and 
reinforce the Nuremberg precedent in recognising the notion of individual 
criminal responsibility of high level officials for launching an aggressive wars, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.105 
 
3.1.3 The legacy and impact of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
The legacy and impact of the Nuremberg Tribunal to the development of 
international criminal law in general, and the crime of aggression in 
particular, can not to be understated. Justice Jackson in his opening 
statement best captured one of the salient positives coming out of the 
Nuremberg trials: 
„That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of 
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgement of the law 
is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.‟106 
 
With regard to its historical legacy, Nuremberg Tribunal can be regarded as 
the zenith of individual criminal liability for aggression.107 Noteworthy also is 
the fact that the Nuremberg Charter, Tribunal and judgement clarified and 
entrenched the crime of aggression (in addition to the other two categories 
of international crimes) in the corpus of customary international law, which 
the United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter: „UNGA‟ or “General 
Assembly”) later adopted and endorsed as the „Nuremberg Principles‟.108  
 
In a nutshell, the Nuremberg Tribunal made a dramatic leap that derived the 
criminality of aggression from its character as an internationally wrongful act 
from the classic mechanism of international law as a system of rights and 
                                                 
105 Beigbeder Yves (1999: 75). See also Ehrenfreund Norbert (2007: 113).  
106 Blumenthal David A. and McCormack Timothy L.H. (2008: 33).  
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obligations that bind states.109 As already noted above, this was totally 
unprecedented under the then existing customary law. It as a result moved 
the international law landscape from prohibiting aggressive war to 
criminalising aggressive war, and making individuals liable for the latter. 
This reasoning as part of the legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal raised a lot 
of debate with regard to its legal basis and sustainability.  
 
3.2 The United Nations and the crime of aggression 
3.2.1 The mandate of the United Nations 
The end of the Second World War set in motion three different but 
interrelated processes that were linked to the threat or use of armed force in 
interstate relations: The first being a reinforcement of the restriction on the 
use of armed force at the San Francisco Conference, the second being the 
United Nations‟ (hereinafter: „UN‟) decision to continue searching for 
clarification on a definition of international aggression, and the third that was 
a bi-product of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals that called for individual 
criminal responsibility for acts of aggression.110  
 
The international body of United Nations was born in San Francisco, United 
States on 26th June 1945, after fifty states signed the Charter of the United 
Nations, the constituent treaty that binds all members. Under the UN 
Charter, article 1(1) spells out one of the purposes of the United Nations as 
being to maintain international peace and security through taking effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, 
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.  
 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter enjoins the States Parties to refrain in their 
international relations from the threatening or using of force against the 
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state, while article 39 
empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and can make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.  Article 51 recognises the States Parties‟ right of self defence 
against any armed attack. 
 
It would appear on the face of it, that some of the above articles create 
interpretation problems with regard to the acts or the crime of aggression. 
For instance, article 2(4), when read with article 39 of the UN Charter, does 
not contain a definition or explanation of the elements of aggression.  In 
addition to the above, it is only the United Nations Security Council 
(hereinafter: „Security Council‟ or „UNSC‟) that has the sole mandate to act 
where the existence of acts of aggression, threats to peace and breaches of 
peace are determined.111This is problematic since it is not a judicial but a 
politically driven body. 
 
It is pertinent however to point out that the UN Charter moved away from 
the traditional concept of war that permitted states to abuse it, and 
employed more closely related concepts that are connected with aggressive 
acts.112 Consequently, the UN Charter very importantly introduced a number 
of closely linked notions to aggressive acts: “use of force” (article 2(4)), 
“armed attack” (article 51), “threat to peace / breach of peace / act of 
aggression” (article 39).113 The notion of an act of aggression as articulated 
under article 39 of the UN Charter is very important since it is central to 
defining the parameters of what ultimately amounts to the crime of 
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aggression. Although there seems to be a change in use of terminology 
under the UN Charter (prohibition of threat or use force) as compared to the 
precursors to the Nuremberg Tribunal such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact that 
expressly used the term „aggression‟, the principle remains same, the 
regulation of illegal wars. 
 
Within the UN Charter, the present-day jus ad bellum anchors itself in article 
2(4), and which helps to redress the shortcomings of the Kellogg–Briand 
Pact by requiring all States Parties of the UN to refrain from threats or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.114 But is important to point out that article 2(4)‟s use of the term 
„force‟ instead of „war‟, instigates debate as to what constitutes „force‟ or 
„unlawful force‟ or even “threat of force” for that matter.  
 
Through the incorporation of the above provisions, the use of force is no 
longer accepted as an instrument of foreign policy since the jus ad bellum 
became the jus contra bellum.115 The above stated injunction in the UN 
Charter against the use of inter-state force is the cornerstone of present-day 
customary international law on crime of aggression.116  
 
3.2.2 The 1974 UN General Assembly Resolution 
Recognising „that there is a widespread conviction of the need to expedite 
the definition of aggression‟, the UNGA through Resolution 2330 (XXII) of 18 
December 1967 established a Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression, that at its 1974 session, adopted by consensus a draft definition 
of aggression that it recommended to the General Assembly for adoption.117 
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The UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 
(hereinafter: „1974 UN Definition of Aggression‟) expounded on the term „act 
of aggression‟.  
 
Article 1 of the 1974 UN Definition of Aggression, defined an act of 
aggression as the „the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state.‟ Seven 
examples of acts of aggression are set out under article 3 of the 1974 UN 
Definition of Aggression.  
 
Although, not legally binding, the 1974 UN Definition of Aggression is 
nevertheless quite a significant text with interpretative value and helps to 
indicate the international community‟s perception of the notion of 
aggression.118  
 
It also helps to reinforce the undefined notion of aggression in the UN 
Charter. It introduced a new „just war doctrine‟, where the authority to 
determine whether or not inter-state violence is permitted no longer belongs 
to the state or its people but lies squarely with the Security Council.119 An 
interpretation of articles 1 and 3 of the 1974 UN Definition of Aggression 
leads one to conclude that an act of aggression includes both grave and 
lesser acts intense war. Although the Security Council has scarcely quoted 
the resolution in its decisions, it would appear that the aim of the resolution 
was not to criminalise aggression, but to aid the Security Council in 
determining if an act of aggression had occurred.120 
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Whereas article 5(2) of the Definition of Aggression pronounces war of 
aggression to be a crime against international peace, the said Definition as a 
whole is not buttressed the criminal ramifications of aggressive war.121 It 
should also be emphasised that the definition was not exhaustive and left 
the Security Council a broad area of discretion, since it was free to 
categorise other acts as aggression under the UN Charter; and it did not 
specify that aggression could entail state responsibility and individual 
criminal liability.122  
 
It is to be concluded however that although, the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression, focused on state-liability and not individual criminal liability, 
ignored the element of mens rea, it brings the world closer to an 
understanding of what acts would constitute aggression under international 
law.123 Its relevance under customary international law is underlined when it 
was considered in discussions concerning the crime of aggression in Rome 
and in Kampala. 
 
3.2.3 The International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice (hereinafter: „ICJ‟) is the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations that was established in June 1945 by the UN 
Charter.124 The Court entertains contentious legal disputes between States 
submitted to it by them and requests for advisory opinions on legal 
questions referred to it by United Nations organs and specialized agencies.125 
In adjudicating disputes between states, the ICJ has passed judgement on 
inter-state disputes concerning the unlawful use of force.  
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Although states tend to frame the issues under contention as concerning the 
commission of aggression, the ICJ has never passed an express 
determination concerned with the commission of aggression; the ICJ 
generally frames the issue, not surprisingly, as whether a state has used 
force in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter.126 Whereas, it cannot be 
disputed that use of force and aggression tend to overlap, one cannot thus 
escape the conclusion that the ICJ favours the broader interpretation of the 
concept. It is noted that earlier in 1970, the ICJ in a dictum that 
revolutionised international law, the said Court mentioned the outlawing of 
acts of aggression as the first of a list of examples of obligations erga 
omnes127.  
 
In the Nicaragua case the ICJ adjudged that the list of acts spelt out under 
article 3 of the Resolution 3314 amounted to aggression and reflected the 
prevailing customary international law.128 The court further observed that 
the US had in effect breached article 2(4) through its use of unlawful force 
against Nicaragua. In the DR Congo case, just like in the previous case the 
ICJ adjudged Uganda to have engaged in unlawful use of force in the DRC 
even when it raised the claim of self defence. 129  
 
There seems to be no consensus in the academic world whether the ICJ‟s 
positive judgement that a state used unlawful force against another state 
can be equated to the committing of an act of aggression as expressed 
under customary international law.130  
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3.3 The Preparatory Workings towards creating the ICC 
3.3.1 The International Law Commission 
The International Law Commission (hereinafter: „ILC‟)131 was at the epi-
centre of defining and codifying the crime of aggression since the 1950s. It 
helped formulate the Nuremberg Principles (which are essentially the 
principles of international law that are recognised in the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal), which 
were eventually adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1950.132  
 
On 17th November 1950, the UNGA, in resolution 378 (V) referred to the ILC 
a proposal made by the USSR regarding the agenda item “Duties of States in 
the event of the outbreak of hostilities” that provided that the General 
Assembly, “considering it necessary ... to define the concept of aggression 
as accurately as possible,” declares, inter alia, that “in an international 
conflict that State shall be declared the attacker which first commits” one of 
the acts enumerated in the proposal.133 
 
Consequently in 1951, during the third session, ILC considered the issue 
whether it should enumerate aggressive acts or try to define aggression in 
general terms.134 The ILC concluded that it was futile to define aggression by 
a detailed enumeration of aggressive acts, since no enumeration could be 
exhaustive.135 The ILC considered it inappropriate to limit the freedom of 
judgement of the competent organs of the United Nations by a rigid, and a 
                                                 
131 The International Law Commission was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1948 for the "promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification. See 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_5.htm (Last accessed 01/10/2011).  
132 Kemp Gerhard (2010: 140, 142). The author states, that, „One important clarification that the ILC 
included in their commentary on the Nuremberg Principles, was on the meaning of the words „waging 
of a war of aggression‟. It was noted that some members of the ILC regarded this to extend criminal 
liability for „waging‟ a war of aggression to all persons (in uniform) who fought in the war in question. 
However, the ILC interpreted the judgment at Nuremberg to limit responsibility for „waging‟ a war of 
aggression to senior military officers and personnel and senior State officials.  
133 UN doc. A/C.1/608. 
134 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, vol. II, document A/CN.4/44.  
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necessarily incomplete list of acts constituting aggression hence choosing to 
search for a general and abstract definition.136 Important to note is that this 
attempt was unsuccessful for many subsequent years that followed due to 
lack of agreement.  
 
However, on 10th December 1981, UNGA through Resolution 36/106 re-
invited the ILC „to resume its work with a view of elaborating on the draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind and to examine 
it with the required priority in order to review it, duly taking into account the 
results achieved by the process of the progressive development of 
international law‟.137 The ILC appointed a Special Rapportuer on the subject, 
who proceeded with his on the draft code during the thirty-fourth session in 
1982, thirty-fifth session in 1983, forty-third session in 1991, forty-sixth 
session in 1994 and forty-seventh session in 1995.138  
 
It was during the forty-eighth session of the Commission, in 1996, that the 
ILC adopted the final text of the „draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind‟ in which Part Two included the crimes of: aggression 
(article 16), genocide (article 17), crimes against humanity (article 18), 
crimes against UN and associated personnel (article 19), and war crimes 
(article 20).139 
 
Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind (1996) was closely modeled on the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal: „An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in 
or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression 
                                                 
136 http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_5.htm (Last accessed 01/10/2011).  
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139 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 43 to 50. 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.‟140 More 
importantly, the ILC did not provide a definition of the crime of aggression, 
and included a provision under which any proceeding dealing with an act of 
aggression or connected therewith could not be initiated unless the Security 
Council had made a determination that the state in question had committed 
an act of aggression.141  
 
There is great importance to be attached to the work of the ILC. It is 
important to note that article 16 of the ILC‟s 1996 draft Code confirmed that 
the crime of aggression constituted a crime under international 
law.142Gerhard Werle observed in this regard that: „The reports and drafts … 
are aids in determining customary international law and general principles of 
law, and thus have significant influence on the development of international 
criminal law. The various revisions of the [draft Codes] have proved 
particularly influential for substantive international criminal law.‟143 
 
3.3.2 The Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of the ICC 
In order to consider the major substantive issues that arose from the draft 
Code prepared by the ILC and to prepare for an international conference, the 
UNGA established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court that met twice in 1995.144 However, there was 
not much progress achieved under the committee from the 
recommendations forwarded by the ILC. 
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3.3.3 The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court 
Under Resolution 50/46 of 11 December 1995, UNGA established a 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (hereinafter: „PrepCom‟) to discuss further the major substantive and 
administrative issues arising out of the draft statute prepared by the ILC. 
The PrepCom took into account the different views expressed during its 
meetings, while it prepared a widely acceptable consolidated text of a 
convention for an international criminal court as a step towards 
consideration by a future diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries.145 The 
PrepCom met from 1996 to 1998, a period in which, the said committee was 
tasked with preparing a draft international instrument (to be discussed by 
the Diplomatic Conference) that was to establish the ICC.146 
 
The said committee identified two areas as possible points of departure in its 
discussions on the crime of aggression, that is: the provision on aggression 
in the Nuremberg Charter and the 1974 UN Definition of Aggression, which it 
found as not being acceptable for inclusion as part of definition of the crime 
of aggression.147 The discussions concerning both the definition of the crime 
of aggression, as well as the role for the Security Council demonstrated the 
deep divisions that existed among the delegates and the States they 
represented.148 It was also clear in the PrepCom discussions, that a number 
of states used the 1974 UN Definition of Aggression as a working definition, 
hence giving support to the approach where the definition would contain an 
enumeration of acts constituting aggression.149  
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Presumably the main objective that reined at this stage was to restrict 
individual criminal responsibility to only clear cut cases of illegal and massive 
use of armed force leading to the invasion of foreign territory as laid out in 
the Nuremberg precedent.150 Germany‟s Proposal seemed to have received 
most support in the discussions; it described aggression as:  
„an armed attack directed by a State against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State when this armed attack was undertaken in [manifest] 
contravention of the Charter of the United Nations [with the object or result of 
establishing a [military] occupation of, or annexing, the territory of such other State 
or part thereof by armed forces of the attacking State.‟151 
 
Although, the proposal was not adopted by the PrepCom due to lack of 
consensus among members of the said committee, it later acted as point of 
reference for the delegate deliberations at the later diplomatic conference. 
 
3.3.4 The 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference and the Rome Statute 
During the Rome Conference, the same issues that confronted the 
Preparatory Committee came back to haunt the delegates.152 The states 
present at the Rome Conference faced two inherent difficulties: (1) how to 
define the prohibited acts of aggression with sufficient clarity; and (2) who 
would determine that an act of aggression had occurred, hence „triggering‟ 
the court‟s jurisdiction over individual liability.153 While many delegations 
regarded the crime of aggression as essentially a crime committed by states 
rather than individuals, other delegations regarded aggression as too 
„political‟ a concept that was not susceptible to legal definition.154 In addition 
to the above, there were also some delegations that were concerned that 
the paramount role of the Security Council in matters of international peace 
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and security would be eroded by the inclusion of aggression in the ICC 
Statute.155  
 
Eventually during the deliberations, no agreement was forthcoming among 
the delegates on a conclusive definition of the crime of aggression, and the 
role of the Security Council, although not extensively dealt with during the 
Conference due to lack of time.156 In the end, states agreed on a 
compromise where the Statute of the ICC would incorporate the crime of 
aggression, but the Court‟s jurisdiction over the crime would be suspended 
until states had agreed on a definition in the future, and on how the 
jurisdiction of the Court would be triggered.157 In the final text of the Rome 
Statute that was adopted reflected a compromise between the delegations 
opposed to and those in favour of the inclusion of aggression, but also 
reflected some of the concerns of many of the delegations regarding the 
conditions under which the ICC should exercise its jurisdiction, as well as the 
perceived role of the Security Council as expressed under UN Charter 
Chapter VII.158  
 
The final provision agreed upon was included under article 5(1) (d) that 
grants the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. It is salient to note 
that Article 5(2) provides that the definition “shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”, an indication of the 
future  role the Security Council may or should play in relation to this 
crime.159  
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The inclusion of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the ICC 
reflected a significant step towards a longstanding effort to define it and 
grant a court jurisdiction over individual perpetrators of the same crime.  
 
3.4.0 Post Rome developments leading into the Review 
Conference 
3.4.1 The Preparatory Commission for the ICC 
At the end of the Rome Conference, delegates adopted Resolution F on the 
establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court that was an annex to the Final Act of the Rome Conference that 
adopted the Rome Statute.160  
 
The Preparatory Commission‟s mandate was to draft: (a) rules of procedure 
and evidence; (b) elements of crimes; (c) a relationship agreement between 
the Court and the United Nations; and (d) basic principles governing a 
headquarters agreement to be negotiated between the Court and the host 
country.161 The same body was in addition to the above, to draft the: (a) 
financial regulations and rules; (b) an agreement on the privileges and 
immunities of the Court; (c) a budget for the first financial year; (d) the 
rules of procedure of the Assembly of States Parties; and (e) proposals for a 
provision on aggression.162 The Preparatory Commission appointed various 
working groups on the above items that met between 1999 and 2002.163  
 
The Working group on the Crime of Aggression was however unable to reach 
a consensus on the outstanding issues concerning the definition of the crime 
and the role if any of the Security Council since a number of the states 
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involved maintained their previous positions.164It did however make some 
progress on the role the Security Council, where two options were put 
forward. Otto Triffterer thus explains:  
„One option – if adopted would have provided that the Security Council would be 
requested by the Court as to whether in a given situation the crime of aggression 
has been committed. In absence of a decision of the Security Council within a given 
period of time, the Court could then proceed with its investigations or prosecution. 
An alternative proposal – basing itself on the well known Uniting-for-Peace-
Resolution of the General Assembly – provided that, if the Security Council was not 
able in reaching any such determination within a given time frame, the General 
Assembly would then be asked in turn by the Court to make such a recommendation. 
Again, where no such recommendation is made in due course, the Court could – 
under the proposal as them submitted – still go forward with its proceedings.‟165 
 
The above recommendations served as the basis for the future debate on 
the crime of aggressions.  
 
3.4.2 The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
During the first session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute in September 2002, the delegates adopted a resolution on the 
continuity of work in respect to the crime of aggression of which it was 
agreed that:  
„(1) a special working group on the crime of aggression (herein after: „SWGCA‟) shall 
be established, open on an equal footing to all States Members of the United Nations 
or members of specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for 
the purpose of elaborating the proposals for a provision on aggression in accordance 
with the Rome Statute (article 5, paragraph 2) and Resolution F (paragraph 7); (2) 
the special working group shall submit such proposals to the Assembly for 
consideration at a Review Conference; and (3) the special working group shall meet 
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during the regular sessions of the Assembly or at any other time that the Assembly 
deems appropriate and feasible.‟166  
 
The SWGCA met in various locations between September 2003 and February 
2009 where it held deliberations and concluded its work.167 The discussion 
papers compiled by the Preparatory Commission Coordinators from Tanzania 
and Argentina served as valuable points of reference and guidance to the 
discussions of the Special Working Group on Aggression.168 Kemp observed 
that the discussion paper proposed by the Chairman of the Working Group in 
January 2007 reflected two approaches. He stated; 
„It proposed an Article 8bis to be inserted into the Rome Statute of the ICC. This 
proposed Article provides for two variants. Variant (a) reflects the differentiated 
approach and Variant (b) the monistic approach. 
„Variant (a): 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of aggression” 
when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action of a State, that person (leads) (directs) (organizes and/or directs) 
(engages in) the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of 
aggression/armed attack 
Variant (b): 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of aggression” 
when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action of a State, that person orders or participates actively in the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed attack 
continue under both variants: 
[which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations] [such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act 
which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, 
the territory of another State or part thereof]. 
                                                 
166 Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.1 of 9 September 2002. See UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002: 328). 
167 Kress Claus and Von Holtzendorff Leonie (: 1184). See also Trahan Jennifer (2011: 56). 
168 Kemp Gerhard (2010: 281). 
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2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means an act referred to in 
[articles 1 and 3 of] United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974.‟169 
 
It was thus the outcome from SWGCA‟s 2009 Proposal that provided a 
foundation for the First ICC Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda.  The 
monistic approach in variant (b) seems to have been the most acceptable to 
the delegates at the Review Conference. 
 
3.5.0 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the judicial and legislative 
history of the crime of aggression from the Second World War that started in 
late 1930s to the 1998 Rome Conference.  The above period helped to 
redefine the customary international law nature of the crime of aggression 
that individuals can criminally be held liable for committing the said crime.  
 
Although, the provisions of the UN Charter and the 1974 UN Definition of 
Aggression did not criminalise aggression, they in themselves gave a new 
sense of direction to the international community‟s quest to define it in the 
preparatory works for the creation of the ICC.  
 
It thus can also be concluded that the adoption of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC was fundamentally a historical achievement, although its undoing lay in 
the fact that the Rome Statute put the crime of aggression in a state of 
abeyance.170  
 
 
 
                                                 
169 Kemp Gerhard (2010: 284). See also Zuppi Alberto L. (2007-2008: 3,4) and Kress Claus and Von 
Holtzendorff Leonie (2010: 1189). 
170 Blokker Niels and Kress Claus (2010: 889). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXAMINING THE OUTCOME OF THE FIRST ICC 
REVIEW CONFERENCE 
 
„In 1998, we made Rome a by-word for international criminal justice. Let us now 
write Kampala in that illustrious history, as well. Let it be known as the place where 
the international community … coming together in concert … closed the door on the 
era of impunity and … acting in concert …ushered in the new Age of 
Accountability.‟171 
 
4.0    Introduction 
This chapter is meant to highlight main discussions and negotiations, and 
examine the final outcome of the First ICC Review Conference of 2010 that 
took place in Kampala, Uganda. The discussion focuses on provisions of the 
landmark resolution with a specific analysis of the outcome with regard to 
the crime of aggression. The chapter also critiques, and discusses the impact 
of the outcome on the ICC.  
 
4.1.0   The negotiations and final outcome of the Review 
Conference 
The First ICC Review Conference took place in Kampala (Uganda) from 31st 
May to 11th June 2010.172 During night-time of 11th to 12th June 2010, the 
Assembly of States Parties to the ICC adopted Resolution RC/Res. 6 by 
consensus.173  
 
Resolution RC/Res. 6 contains article 8bis (defines a crime of aggression), 
articles 15bis and 15ter (provides for the ICC‟s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression), and annex III that contains the “Understandings regarding the 
                                                 
171http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-statements-BanKi-moon-
ENG.pdf (Last accessed on 01/10/2011). 
172 Marschner Laura and Olma Isabelle (2010: 529). 
173 Heinsch Robert (2010: 715). 
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amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the 
Crime of Aggression”.  
 
The primary challenge that confronted the delegates at the Review 
Conference concerned whether they could reach agreement on the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, and the said court‟s relationship 
with the Security Council.174 
 
4.2.0 Individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression 
The notion of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression is 
entrenched in article 8bis (1). Therein, it states: „For the purpose of this 
Statute, „crime of aggression‟ means the planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations.‟  
 
From the above provision, it is clear through the use of the word „a person‟ 
that the crime of aggression can only be committed by a natural individual 
person, and not an artificial person. This is in tandem with the other 
international crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Military 
Tribunals, the ICC and the Ad Hoc Tribunals. It however differs from the 
Nuremburg Tribunal, which also had the jurisdiction to try political 
organisations.  
 
When article 8bis (1) is dissected, a number of conclusions can be drawn 
from the above provision. In the first instance, it can be concluded that the 
                                                 
174 Heinsch Robert (2010: 716). See also Trahan Jennifer (2011: 57). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
four main acts of commission of the crime of aggression for the principal 
perpetrator are: planning, preparation, initiation or execution. It is however 
to be contended that the above stated list does not exclude other modes of 
participation since the new paragraph 3bis to be inserted in article 25 states 
that the provisions of the former, in principle also apply to the crime of 
aggression. The origins of this provision are said to have been article 6 (a) of 
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, where the word „execution‟ is used 
to replace “waging of a war”.175  
 
A second important conclusion form 8bis (1) is that the crime of aggression 
is what can be termed as a „leadership crime‟. This unique quality is 
expressed through the use of the statement that it is a „person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a state‟. The implication of this provision is that it is only the top echelons 
(political and military of leaders) of a state that are susceptible to being 
charged and tried for the crime of aggression. Hence the ordinary soldiers 
and state officials would never be included under this ambit.176 In this 
regard, this was one of the primary distinguishing features between the 
crime of aggression and other international crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. 
 
The fact that the crime of aggression is distinctly a leadership crime raises a 
pertinent question of how it relates to article 25 of the Rome Statute. This 
was resolved through the insertion of article of 3bis within article 25 that 
provides that the crime of aggression would only apply to persons in a 
leadership position to direct the political or military action of a State, and as 
                                                 
175 Heinsch Robert (2010: 721). See also Ambos Kai (2010: 465). 
176 Trahan Jennifer (2011: 56). 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
a consequence closing the door to accessory responsibility perpetrators.177 It 
is also important to note that unlike other international crimes that can be 
tried under the Rome Statute, it is impossible for an individual acting alone, 
absent state action, to commit the crime of aggression.178 
  
The third important conclusion concerns the qualification of the act of 
aggression in article 8bis (1), which states that by „its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.‟ 
This raises very controversial and emotive questions like for instance: In the 
first instance, what in essence, legally constitutes character, gravity and 
scale? Secondly, what would technically amount to a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations? Thirdly, does the manifest have to include 
all three features, one or two of them to be considered a violation of the UN 
Charter?  
 
It has been argued that the requirement of a manifest violation under three 
qualities was intended to exclude “borderline cases” or those „falling within a 
grey area‟ both factually (when the act of state does not meet the required 
„gravity‟ or „scale‟, like for instance minimal border incursions), as well as 
legally (that is, debatable cases, where the act of state due to its „character‟ 
does not constitute a manifest violation of the Charter).179  
 
The threshold is neither found in the UN Charter nor in the 1974 UN 
Definition of Aggression.180 It has been asserted that if one traversed the 
travaux preparatoires, it becomes clear that the inclusion qualification was 
meant to exclude all violations of the prohibition of the use of force that are 
controversial and not manifest violations of UN Charter like for instance 
                                                 
177 Heinsch Robert (2010: 734). 
178 Trahan Jennifer (2011: 56). 
179 Trahan Jennifer (2011: 56). 
180 Heinsch Robert (2010: 726). 
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situations of „humanitarian intervention‟ or „responsibility to protect‟, 
anticipatory self defence attacks, cross-border exchanges of fire and cross 
border incursions.181   
 
4.3.0 The definition of the crime of aggression 
The definition of the crime of aggression did not raise too much debate since 
consensus had been built during earlier meetings of the SWGCA. 
Consequently, the 2009 SWGCA Proposal on the definition of the crime of 
aggression was adopted by Review Conference with an addition of the 
respective Elements of Crimes but without any other significant changes.182  
 
For purposes of the definition of the crime of aggression, reference has to be 
made to article 8bis (1), which defines the said crime as „the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of 
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations‟. Article 8bis (2) adds 
the following, while clarifying that, “for the purpose of paragraph 1, „act of 
aggression‟ means the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.‟  
 
It would appear that the above provision is near cumulative reflection of 
article 2 of the 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3314 and article 6 (a) of 
the Nuremburg Charter. Both provisions of articles 8bis must be read 
together to conceptualise what the definition of a crime of aggression 
entails. In essence, simply put, a crime of aggression involves the planning, 
                                                 
181 Heinsch Robert (2010: 730). 
182 Heinsch Robert (2010: 721). 
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preparing, initiating or executing of armed force that is contrary to the UN 
Charter by a leader of one state against another state.  
 
Through the use of the word „manifest‟, it has been argued that the above 
definition when operationalised, will not apply to the „ordinary‟ violations of 
the use of force but to the most „egregious‟ cases.183 This on the outset 
seems to differ from the existing customary international law that would on 
the face of it cover other ordinary prohibitions of the use of force. 
 
It goes further to note that any of the seven listed acts of aggression 
(regardless of a declaration of war) qualify as an act of aggression. The 
listed acts are exactly the same as those spelt out under article 3 of the 
1974 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the Definition of Aggression. 
It has been argued that the reproduction of the Resolution 3314 in article 
8bis (2) is problematic since it was never construed to be used in cases 
involving individual criminality (but for state responsibility), and the list is 
not exhaustive.184 
 
In effect, only clear cases of aggression are covered by the definition hence 
leaving out actions like „humanitarian‟ or „responsibility to protect‟ 
interventions.185 It has been thus argued that the amendments reflect 
shades of modernity, but remain largely „conservative‟ at the same time 
since it extends individual criminal responsibility from the traditional concept 
of „war of aggression‟ to „acts of aggression‟ listed in Article 8bis.186 
 
                                                 
183 Paulus Andreas  (2009: 1124).  
184 Heinsch Robert (2010: 723). See also Paulus Andreas (2009: 1120).   
185 Marschner Laura and Olma Isabelle (2010: 532). 
186 Carsten Stahn (2010: 876). 
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4.4.0 The elements of crime for the crime of aggression 
Article 8bis (1) states the required acteus reus for the crime of aggression as 
being the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a 
leadership position. However, it has been contended that the above are just 
alternatives in themselves, since the requirement is that the accused should 
have made a substantial contribution to the act of aggression in any one of 
the above stated actions.187  
 
The above provision is silent on the specific mental elements for the said 
crime. The effect of the above situation is that, one has to make reference to 
the general clause in article 30 of the Rome Statute.188 In this regard, the 
said article 30 (1) states that the „person shall be criminally liable if the 
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge‟.  Under article 
30 (2), a person has „intent‟ with regard to their conduct, he or she engages 
in the conduct or in relation to a consequence  that person means to cause 
the outcome or is aware that it will happen under the ordinary course of 
events. On the other hand, „knowledge‟ means „awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events‟.189  
 
Annex II of the Resolution contains amendments to the Elements of Crimes 
for the crime of aggression. Therein, under the introduction, it is stated that 
any of the acts mentioned in article 8 bis (2) qualify as act of aggression 
(also referred to material elements). It goes further to note that „manifest‟ is 
an objective qualification and the there no requirements to prove that the 
perpetrator made a legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed force 
was inconsistent with the UN Charter or the manifest nature of the violation 
                                                 
187 Samford (2010: 23).  
188 Triffterer Otto (2008: 895, 914). See also Heinsch Robert (2010: 732). 
189 Article 30 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
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of the UN Charter.190  The above resonates with the spirit of article 32 (2) of 
the Rome Statute that spells out that a mistake of law with regard to 
whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal liability.191 
 
Under the amended elements of crime, it is provided that there six 
considerations that are in tandem with article 30 of the Rome Statute:  
„(1). The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression. 
(2). The perpetrator was a person in a position effective to exercise control over or 
to direct the political or military action of the State which committed the act of 
aggression. (3). The act of aggression – the use of armed force by a State against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations – was 
committed. (4). The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations. (5). The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 6. The 
perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.‟ 
 
An individual can commit the crime of aggression through any of the acts 
listed under 8bis (2), which are to be construed as the material elements for 
the commission of the crime of aggression. 
 
4.5.0 The jurisdiction issues of the ICC for the Crime of 
Aggression  
Under the Resolution RC/Res.6, the issues concerning jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression are divided under two articles: (a) article 15bis concerns 
the state referrals and Prosecutor‟s proprio motu investigative powers, and 
(b) article 15ter concerns Security Council referrals. 
                                                 
190 Annex II of Resolution RC/Res. 6, 21. 
191HeinschRobert(2010:732).Seealso 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression&idudctp=22&show=all#22 (Last accessed on 05/10/2011). 
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With regard to State Party referrals or investigations undertaken under the 
Prosecutor‟s proprio motu powers, the ICC‟s prosecutor has to first find out 
whether the Security Council has determined that an act of aggression has 
been committed.192  It is only after the Security Council has made such a 
determination that the prosecutor can proceed with the investigation of the 
crime of aggression.193  
 
Where no such determination has been made by the Security Council, the 
prosecutor may proceed with the investigation of the crime of aggression 
upon receiving authorisation of the Pre-Trial Division, and the Security 
Council has not decided otherwise in accordance with article 16.194It has 
been contended that the requirement that Pre-Trial Division authorise the 
commencement of investigations complements the substantive requirement 
that the state act of aggression must have constituted a manifest violation of 
the UN Charter.195  
 
Under Security Council referrals, article 15ter (1) states that, „the Court may 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 
13, paragraph (b), subject to the provisions of this article‟. Article 13 (b) of 
the Rome Statute on its part provides that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over a crime in a situation which has been referred by the 
Security Council (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to the Prosecutor. 
The spirit of article 13 is again echoed in paragraph 2 of the annexed 
Understandings regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
                                                 
192 Article 15bis (6). The prosecutor has to inform the UN Secretary General of the situation 
confronting the court, and provide all relevant information and documents.   
193 Article 15bis (7). 
194 Article 15bis (8). 
195 Blokker Niels and Kress Claus (2010: 894).  
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International Criminal Court on the crime of aggression.196 The implication 
here is that with the Security Council referring a situation to the ICC, it has 
already made a determination of an act of aggression, and there is by 
inference no need to make a new determination. It has been also argued 
that such a provision gives the Security Council more flexibility in decision 
making that might be helpful „should the Security Council wish to retain its 
past conspicuous reluctance to make a determination that an act of 
aggression has occurred.‟197 
 
It is important to note that with regard to the crime of aggression and a non 
State Party, the ICC has no mandate to exercise jurisdiction over its 
nationals or on its territory. The implications of this provision are that the 
Assembly of State Parties departed from the spirit of article 12 that permits 
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non State Parties. In 
addition to the above, articles 15bis (9) and 15ter (4) provide that a 
determination of act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall not be 
prejudicial to the Court‟s own findings.  
 
Such a provision is meant to protect and guarantee the independence of the 
Court‟s decision from conclusions or determinations of other non ICC bodies 
such as the Security Council that are largely politically motivated.198 It is 
important to add that, in terms of jurisdiction ratione temporis, the Court 
may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression 
committed after a decision in accordance with article 15bis (3) is taken, and 
one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty 
States Parties, whichever is later.199 There is also a deferral or delayed 
jurisdiction condition incorporated in the amendments since it states that a 
                                                 
196 Annex III of Resolution RC/Res.6. 
197 Blokker Niels and Kress Claus (2010: 893). 
198 Heinsch Robert (2010: 741).  
199 Annex III of Resolution RC/Res.6, Para. 3.  
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two-thirds majority of the ASP must be available in order for ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 2017 or a period after.200  
 
With regard to domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, under the 
new amendments, it was agreed that they do not limit or prejudice already 
existing or developed rules of international law or create a new right or 
obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction over the crime when committed 
by another state.201 The deduction that one can make from the above is that 
the delegates seemed aware that todate there isn‟t a universal agreement 
on the crime of aggression, and how it would be incorporated domestically. 
 
4.6.0 The entry into force of crime of aggression provisions  
The three important conditions that must be fulfilled before the ICC can 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In the paragraph 1 of the 
preamble to Resolution RC/Res.6, it is provided that, „…the amendments of 
Statute contained in annex I of the present resolution, which are subject to 
ratification or acceptance and shall enter into force in accordance with article 
121, paragraph 5; and notes that any State Party may lodge a declaration 
referred to in article 15 bis prior to ratification or acceptance.‟ 
 
Article 121 (5) provides that any amendments of articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall 
enter into force for those States Parties that have accepted the amendment 
one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. 
In addition to the above, it is to be noted that identical articles 15bis (2) and 
15ter (2) provide another condition, that the Court may only start to 
exercise jurisdiction with regard to crimes of aggression committed one year 
after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States 
Parties. The third condition is spelt out in another identical provision stated 
                                                 
200 Articles 15bis (3) and 15ter (3). 
201 Annex III of Resolution RC/Res.6, Paras. 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
under articles 15bis (3) and 15ter (3). Therein, it is provided that the Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression only after a decision 
has been taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties 
as required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.    
 
4.7.0 The Opt-Out clause over crime of aggression 
One of the unprecedented and surprising inclusions under the amendments 
brought by Resolution RC/Res.6 was the introduction of opt-out clause for 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, with specific regard to the crime of 
aggression. Under article 15 bis (4) of the said Resolution, the Court may 
not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression for a State Party that 
declared that it does not accept jurisdiction through the lodgment with the 
Registrar of a Declaration stating the same.202 This provision raises more 
questions than answers that can be provided like for instance: Why would 
State Party that has accepted the amendment opt out, and why would a 
State Party that has not accepted the amendments, lodge a declaration.203 
The amendments of the Rome Statute apply to all State Parties, unless they 
decide to opt out of them. 
 
4.8.0 The impact of Resolution RC / Res. 6 
The amendments provide an important point of reference in the assessment 
of aggressive use of force by states against others.204 Resolution RC / Res. 6 
will therefore have an impact on statesmen, international relations and the 
work of the ICC itself.  
 
The outcome of the First ICC Review Conference that redefined the crime of 
aggression and gave the ICC jurisdiction will and can act as a deterrent force 
                                                 
202 The provision further notes that the withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time 
and shall be considered by the State Party within three years.  
203 Heinsch Robert (2010: 739). 
204 Trahan Jennifer (2011: 2).  
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to both States Parties and non States Parties, in the future to stay away 
from committing acts of aggression against other states. This is so since it 
creates individual criminal responsibility for the said crime and makes it a 
leadership crime. Although the ICC has no jurisdiction over the non States 
Parties, the Court can still investigate and prosecute, if the situation was 
referred by the Security Council. The fact that the ICC can investigate and 
try individuals for the crime removes aggression partly from the realm of 
policy, and places it more firmly on the „radar screen‟ of domestic legislators, 
prosecutors, and judges.205  
 
The amendments go a long way in extending the reach of international 
criminal justice and ending impunity for those responsible for perpetrating 
the crime of aggression. When the amendments take effect after 2017, it will 
grant the ICC the mandate and opportunity to investigate and prosecute all 
the four international crimes stipulated under the Rome Statute.  
 
In effect therefore, the results of the First ICC Review Conference strengthen 
the ICC‟s capacity to hold the world‟s worst criminals accountable for their 
actions and give the world a new means to deal with states‟ aggressive 
maneuvers.206 
 
4.9.0 The criticisms leveled against and challenges for the 
ICC arising from Resolution RC / Res. 6 
Resolution RC / Res. 6 is bound to receive and present some challenges for 
the ICC when the amendments come into force. They include the following: 
 
 
 
                                                 
205 Stahn Carsten (2010: 876).  
206http://archive2.globalsolutions.org/press_releases/icc_conference_takes_steps_end_aggression 
(Last accessed on 05/10/11). 
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4.9.1 Uncertain and a postponed jurisdiction for the ICC 
The ICC has to yet for an uncertain date that will come after 1 January 
2017, when a determinant decision will have been taken by the States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, in order for it to start trying individuals for the 
crimes of aggression. This effectively means that the ICC‟s jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression is postponed, and it will take a long time before the 
world ever witnesses the first indictments and / or prosecutions for crimes of 
aggression. Yet, it is a reality that acts of aggression still continue to take 
place unaddressed, and if no clear majority authorises the ICC after the 
above date, the Kampala outcome could turn out to be just a definition and 
nothing more.207  
 
Some however argue that postponed jurisdiction of the ICC somewhat 
addresses the frequently raised concern that the Court was still way too 
young to handle the crime of aggression, and allows the ICC to prepare its 
Pre-Trial Division to meet the new challenges brought by the new crime. 208 
 
4.9.2 Threat to state sovereignty 
With the new amendments, the crime of aggression unlike the other 
international crimes is essentially a leadership crime. The primary target is 
the top leadership of an aggressor state, of whom could include the head of 
state, cabinet ministers, heads of department and military leaders. There 
have thus been suggestions that the crime of aggression can be perceived as 
a threat to state sovereignty.209 This is so since an indictment against the 
leadership of a country could easily be equated to an indictment of the state 
itself. Practically, it may be difficult to separate a whole leadership from the 
state itself. 
 
                                                 
207 Marschner Laura and Olma Isabelle (2010: 533). See also Trahan Jennifer (2011: 83).  
208 Blokker Niels and Kress Claus (2010: 891, 892). 
209 Werle Gerhard (2009: 476).  
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4.9.3 Criticism of the leadership clause 
It can be argued that the incorporation of a leadership clause in the Rome 
Statute for the crime of aggression unfairly or unfavourably restricts the 
possible potential perpetrators for the crime of aggression and encourages 
impunity. There could be other individuals that could be liable for the 
perpetration of the crime but go un-charged because of the above 
threshold.210  
 
In this regard, the potential perpetrators should include people that hold lots 
of societal influence such as traditional rulers, the mass-media players, civil 
society leaders and religious leaders; who may also be linked to the state or 
its institutions in some countries but not necessarily be part of the 
government or military setup. It was revealed, for instance, in the German 
Industrialists trials (and other trials) after the Second World War that people 
with economic power could significantly participate or influence wars of 
aggression.211  
 
The characterisation and categorisation of crime of aggression as a 
leadership crime presents difficulties for the complementarity principle in the 
Rome Statute. In terms, of practical implementation, there will be challenges 
of domestic investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression.212  
 
4.9.4 The issue of ‘manifest violation’ 
The requirement of „manifest violation‟ as used in article 8bis is bound to 
create challenges in its interpretation. Questions will be raised on what 
legally constitutes a manifest violation? Does it include all perceived or 
potential legal and non legal acts of aggression such as those under 
humanitarian interventions, „responsibility to protect‟ interventions, and for 
                                                 
210 Kai Ambos (2010: 489).  
211 Stahn C. and Sluiter G. (2008: 715). 
212 Stahn Carsten (2010: 880).  
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instance, also Israel‟s raid of Entebbe to rescue her kidnapped nationals. The 
Court will certainly have a challenge to determine what acts by their 
character, gravity and scale constitute a manifest violation of the UN 
Charter.  
 
4.9.5 Legal weight to be attached to Annex III concerning 
the Understandings 
Resolution RC / Res. 6 has Annex III that incorporates the Understandings to 
the amendments. They raise the challenge of deciding what relevance and 
legal weight can be attached to the „Understandings‟. This is especially 
important since they were not part of the preparatory works of the ICC but a 
creation of the Review Conference. 
 
4.9.6 Incorporation of UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 
It has been argued that the reproduction of the Resolution 3314 in article 
8bis (2) is problematic since it was never construed for use in cases 
involving individual criminality (but for state responsibility), and the list is 
not exhaustive. When the amendments come into operation after 2017, this 
is bound to become a serious point of discussion for bureaucrats, academics, 
diplomats and legal practitioners. The issue is of paramount importance 
given the fact that since article 8bis (2) expressly states that the act of 
aggression is to be determined in accordance with Resolution 3314, yet 
importantly article 4 of the latter states that the list is not exhaustive. It 
raises the question of legality and specificity in the context of what is to be 
included hereunder.  
 
As per articles 15bis (3) and 15ter (3), the ICC can only start to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after 1st January 2017, and after 
the ratification of thirty States Parties to the Rome Statute (as per articles 
15bis (2) and 15ter (2). Whereas this is attainable, it does postpone the 
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jurisdiction of the ICC for the crime of aggression for a little while. It has 
been argued however that such a time period benefits every state since it 
permits States Parties to re-align their national regime to the amendments, 
and buys time for the ICC to establish itself as a permanent court that tries 
international crimes.213  
 
4.9.7 The Opt-Out clause for States Parties 
The inclusion of an opt-out clause (article 15bis (4)) in the Rome Statute 
presents more negatives than positives. It has been argued that this clause 
could have been inserted in the Rome Statute to defeat the objectives of 
those that gave the ICC the power to try perpetrators of the crime of 
aggression.214 The effect is that with its inclusion, the crime of aggression is 
defined but the ICC cannot effectively try any one for it given the fact that it 
creates an escape route out of the court‟s jurisdiction. Amnesty International 
has argued that by allowing States Parties to protect their leaders from 
prosecution for the crime of aggression, there are risks that the credibility of 
the ICC will be brought to question and undermine its work.215  
 
4.10.0 Examining Resolution RC/Res.6 vis-à-vis customary 
international law on the crime of aggression 
To understand the reach of customary international law over the crime of 
aggression, one must draw the distinction between „what is illegal‟ and „what 
is criminal‟. Gerhard Werle, states that under customary international law, it 
is only aggressive war, as a particularly grave and obvious form of 
aggression that is criminalised.216 Before the First World War, the right of a 
state to resort to war, the jus ad bellum, was not outlawed, a situation that 
                                                 
213 Heinsch Robert (2010: 738). 
214 Stahn Carsten (2010: 880).  
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Regina v. Jones (2006: 147). 
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changed dramatically after the said war, when it was outlawed.217However, 
the present customary international law on the crime of aggression is 
primarily the bi-product of the judgements of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, state practice and the spirit expressed in the instruments of the 
last century.  
 
In this regard, reference is made to articles 6 (a) and 5 (a) of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals respectively that created a crime against 
peace for planning, preparing, initiating or waging a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international instruments or obligations. The criminality of 
waging aggressive war was affirmed in UN General Assembly Resolution 95 
(1) of 1946 and the 1974 UN Definition of aggression.218 It has been argued 
that the „Nuremberg and Tokyo trials embodied the state practice that is 
necessary for the creation of customary international law‟ that was affirmed 
by states‟ official statements with regard to the 1974 UN Definition of 
Aggression.219  
 
The final inclusion of the crime of aggression under the 1998 Rome Statute 
of the ICC was a clear testament of the States parties of its criminality under 
customary international law.220 In effect therefore, acts of aggression that do 
not reach the level of intensity of aggressive war are not criminal under 
customary international law.221Another quality linked to the above is that the 
attacker must aim to subjugate another state and use its resources for the 
benefit of the attacking state.222The threshold for criminal responsibility 
under customary international law is high since the definition of the term 
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“war of aggression” also effectively defines the scope of acts of aggression 
that are criminalised.223  
 
Under customary international law, the crime of aggression is a leadership 
crime. Although, the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were 
silent on the nature of perpetrators that could be tried for the crime of 
aggression, it is inferred from the Tribunals judgements that it is only key 
political and military individuals could accrue criminal responsibility.224 A 
crucial mental element with regard to the crime of aggression is that there 
must be „intent‟, where the perpetrator was aware of the aggressive aims of 
the war, and still goes ahead to participate in its planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging.225  
 
The above creates quite a narrow limitation of the offence, which would 
appear to have been expanded by the amendments of the outcome from the 
First ICC Review Conference. It would appear that with the amendments, the 
ICC‟s jurisdiction was expanded just beyond aggressive wars to include all 
the acts spelt out in the 1974 UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression 
Resolution 3314.  
 
The extent was also however restricted (comparable to customary 
international law) to within a certain threshold requirement that the acts „by 
character, gravity and scale [constitute] a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations.‟226  It can thus be argued that the new definition of 
aggression under the amended Rome Statute and that recognised by the 
Military Tribunals is substantially the same. Like under customary 
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international law, the amendments to the Rome Statute categorise the crime 
of aggression as a leadership crime.  
 
Just like under customary international law that recognises the role of the 
Security Council with regard to acts of aggression (under article 24 of the UN 
Charter), the amended Rome Statute maintains this recognition with some 
modifications of what role the body would play in determining acts of 
aggression. In addition to the above, it must be argued that both under 
customary international law and the new amendments to the Rome Statute, 
the concept of aggression remains centered on use of illegal interstate 
violence as reflected in the nexus requirement of a leadership requirement 
for perpetrators and the definition of the term „act of aggression‟ as „use of 
armed force by a State‟.227 
 
4.11.0 Conclusion 
There is no doubt today, that the crime of aggression is not just the 
supreme but it represents one of the most if not the most serious breach of 
fundamental rules of the international community.228 The outcome from the 
First Review Conference in Kampala marked the culmination of an almost 
century-old debate about the international criminalisation of aggression.229  
 
The fact that delegates at the Kampala Conference reached a consensus on 
the crime of aggression is to be applauded and celebrated, for it represented 
a significant step forward for development of international criminal law. The 
States Parties to the Rome Statute were in Resolution RC/Res.6 not only 
able to define the crime of aggression but also spell out the jurisdiction of 
the ICC over the said crime. The question of the ICC‟s jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression was of utmost importance since it evolved and also spelt 
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out how the court would relate with the Security Council. The new 
amendments certainly raise new opportunities and challenges for the young 
permanent court, and will without a doubt have a significant influence on the 
ICC and the world at large when they eventually come into force.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GENERAL CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PROPOSED 
WAY FORWARD 
 
5.0 General research study conclusions 
The crime of aggression in its several variants has evolved and developed by 
leaps over the last two centuries. This differs greatly from the original 
thinking aligned to the notion of war as was, for instance, articulated by the 
Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz in a famous quote attributed to him: 
„War is merely a continuation of politics by other means.‟230 Today, the use 
of illegal wars by states against other states is regulated with criminal 
sanctions for individuals at the centre of perpetrating them. 
 
In this study, it has been conclusively shown that the historical development 
of aggression was and is still closely linked to how societies perceived going 
to war with another society. From ancient times, through to the last few 
centuries, aggression was and has been linked to the use of the terms: „just‟ 
and „unjust‟ wars plus „legal‟ and „illegal‟ wars. It was only in the early 20th 
century after the First World War that the debate started to change to 
consider the possible criminal element in illegal wars. 
 
Another conclusion to this study is that the Nuremberg Tribunal was 
effectively the birth place of the modern day crime of aggression. It was the 
Nuremberg Tribunal that fundamentally moved the legal jurisprudence from 
emphasis on unlawful wars to illegal wars, and finally to criminal wars. Since 
a state cannot be criminally charged, the Nuremberg Tribunal introduced not 
only the crime of aggression (in form of crimes against peace) but also 
individual criminal responsibility for the same. In this regard, Benjamin B. 
Ferencz has rightly opined that:  
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„The most important achievement of the Nuremberg trials, after over 40 million 
people had died in World War Two, was the confirmation that war-making was no 
longer a national right but had become, and henceforth would be condemned, as an 
international crime. That great historical step forward toward a more rational and 
human world order under law must not be allowed to perish.‟ 
 
It is also to be concluded that the UN Charter and the 1974 UN Definition on 
Aggression were very important in the conceptualisation and eventual 
development of the crime of aggression to its present state. Although silent 
on individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression, both helped 
refine how the international community would ultimately define the crime. 
For some decades, the cold war between the Eastern and Western blocs 
seemed to have shelved any serious discussion concerning the crime of 
aggression after the Second World War. True to this, none of the statutes of 
the international hybrid courts that were created after the international 
military tribunals did mention the crime of aggression.  
 
It was the groundbreaking Rome Statute which established the ICC that 
returned the crime of aggression to the radar of the international 
community. Although article 5 of the Rome Statute included the crime of 
aggression, it was neither defined nor was the ICC‟s jurisdiction over it 
stated.  
 
It took over ninety years since the German Kaiser Wilhelm II escaped 
charges for “committing the supreme offence against international morality 
and the sanctity of treaties” during the First World War, and over sixty five 
years since the “crime against peace” was included in the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, for the international community to define the crime of 
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aggression at the First ICC Review Conference.231 It is thus fair to conclude 
that with the amendments to the Rome Statute at the Review Conference, 
the crime of aggression is today fully established as part of the corpus of 
international crimes. 
 
It is also to be concluded that just like 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference 
that adopted the Rome Statute of the ICC, 2010 Kampala ICC Review 
Conference was another historical achievement, as far as the crime of 
aggression is concerned.232 It brought to an end a complex process that had 
span decades to define and codify the crime of aggression. It does appear 
that the fact that the ICC will not be able to try anyone for the crime of 
aggression till after 1st January 2017 was the price that had to be paid in 
order for the international community to reach a consensus with regard to 
the crime of aggression.233    
 
It is a conclusion of this study that the final outcome from the First ICC 
Review Conference was important since it helped to elaborate some of the 
areas of customary international law that were still unclear. Under 
customary international law, it was clear that the crime of aggression 
entailed elements of state perpetrated aggression against another state by 
the leadership of the former state. In effect, the high ranking leaders of a 
state could be tried for the crime of aggression. However, the rubric of 
customary international law was not clear on what acts could be included as 
amounting to crimes of aggression. The amendments to Rome Statute 
helped to give a definition, and clarify to some extent what acts could 
perhaps be categorised as amounting to crimes of aggression. 
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It is also reasonable to conclude that the amendments to the Rome Statute 
with specific regard to the crime of aggression are a negation to the 
complementarity principle, a cornerstone on which of the Rome Statute is 
premised, and the ICC anchored. The ICC has the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons responsible for committing crimes that are of the 
most serious of concern to the international community within a 
complementarity framework.234  
 
Under article 17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has a mandate to investigate 
and prosecute each of the international crimes under its jurisdiction where 
the State Party is unwilling or unable to do so. However, under the 
amendments to the Rome Statute, the States Parties adopted an 
understanding to the effect that the amendments are not to be „interpreted 
as creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with 
respect to an act of aggression committed by another state‟.235  The effect of 
this turnaround is to negate the complementarity principle for the crime of 
aggression where individual States Parties are not obligated to try the crime, 
and create a new class of international crimes under the Rome Statute 
regime. 
 
However, looking at the challenges that confronted the delegates to the 
Kampala Conference, it is fair to say that the outcome was largely a success, 
and in the words of UN Secretary General it is time “to turn up the volume” 
for individual criminality accountability for the crime of aggression.236  One 
will certainly have to wait eagerly to see how it plays out after 1st January 
2017, to see whether and when the world will ever see the first individual 
                                                 
234 Preamble and article 1 of the Rome Statute. 
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investigated and charged with the crime of aggression under the Rome 
Statute. 
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